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SUMMARY

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GENERAL

1. Comment on Italian offer to mediate Anglo-Egyptian controversy:

Premier de Gasperi's offer of Italian good offices to mediate the Anglo-Egyptian controversy stems from a desire to improve Italo-Arab relations, to prevent further political instability in the eastern Mediterranean, and to guard against the economic losses that Italy would suffer from any prolonged closing of the Suez Canal.

De Gasperi stated that Italy could exert her best efforts to conciliate the national aspirations of Middle Eastern peoples with the necessity of defending the common Mediterranean civilization. This championing of Arab nationalism is probably an attempt to gain support from the Arab countries for Italian Peace Treaty revision, which the Arabs have viewed with some suspicion. In addition, the Italians are anxious to allay Egyptian hostility toward continuation of Italy's economic relations with the former Italian colony of Libya, soon to become independent.

In this instance it is probable that de Gasperi's stand is not as entirely favorable to the Egyptian position as would appear from his statements.

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| | NEAR EAST |
| 3. | Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood resolves to conduct campaign of violence and |
| | terrorism: |
| | According to information reaching the US Embassy in Cairo, the fanatic Moslem Brother- hood is planning to go ahead with a program of violence and terrorism, regardless of Egyptian Government policy. One Brotherhood group has acquired 25 machine guns for use against the British. |
| | Comment: The Moslem Brotherhood was banned in Egypt for two and one-half years for its terroristic activities, and is now permitted a semi-legal existence. There is evidence that it has had contacts with Communists. Its hard core membership may be only a few thousand; its adherents under present conditions may be many times more. |
| | Although the Egyptian Prime Minister has asked his people to cease public demonstrations, and while the government may take stronger control measures, reports indicate widespread and violent popular attitudes which, under extremist guidance, may be uncontrollable. |
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| of a refinery at Aden reflects a change in British policy from refining at sources in non-British territory, as in the case of Abadan, to refining within British possessions. Comment: The total production of the proposed AIOC refinery at Aden would amount to approximately one-fifth of the capacit of the large Abadan refinery. Since there are no proven oil fields in the vicinity of Aden, crude oil for the refinery would come chiefly from Iraq and | of a refinery at Aden reflects a change in British policy from refining at sources in non-British territory, as in the case of Abadan, to refining within British possessions. Comment: The total production of the proposed AIOC refinery at Aden would amount to approximately one-fifth of the capacit of the large Abadan refinery. Since there are no proven oil fields in the vicinity of Aden, crude oil for the refinery would come chiefly from Iraq and Kuwait. With the Abadan refinery under Iranian control, the completion of a refinery at Aden would help the British to service Africa and the Middle and | of a refinery at Aden reflects a change in British policy from refining at sources in non-British territory, as in the case of Abadan, to refining within British possessions. Comment: The total production of the proposed AIOC refinery at Aden would amount to approximately one-fifth of the capacit of the large Abadan refinery. Since there are no proven oil fields in the vicinity of Aden, crude oil for the refinery would come chiefly from Iraq and Kuwait. With the Abadan refinery under Iranian control, the completion of a refinery at Aden would help the British to service Africa and the Middle and | of a refinery at Aden reflects a change in British policy from refining at sources in non-British territory, as in the case of Abadan, to refining within British possessions. Comment: The total production of the proposed AIOC refinery at Aden would amount to approximately one-fifth of the capacit of the large Abadan refinery. Since there are no proven oil fields in the vicinity of Aden, crude oil for the refinery would come chiefly from Iraq and Kuwait. With the Abadan refinery under Iranian control, the completion of a refinery at Aden would help the British to service Africa and the Middle and | | The US Consulate in Aden reports that the Anglo Iranian Oil Company will soon build a refinery of approximately five million tons annual capacity in that British Crown colony at an estimated cost of 40 to 50 million pounds sterling. This project would take over two years to complete and would necessitate improving the Aden harbour and constructing loading and unloading facilities for tankers. |
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| - 5 - | - 5 - | - 5 - | | refinery at Aden Far East more e | would help the British to service Africa and the Middle and conomically than from Western Europe. |

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| | 7. Yugoslavs dissatisfied with motives for Western aid: |
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| 25X1A | During General Collins visit to Yugoslavia, Party theoretician Djilas advanced the current complaint that US support was based primarily on Yugoslav political and military defiance of the USSR rather than on the social and industrial progress which the Yugo- slav Government is attempting to achieve internally. Djilas justified the present control of the Yugoslav Government by a small group as a temporary necessity because of the inadequate political education of the masses. |
| | Comment: Djilas' remarks were probably meant as a warning that Yugoslavia will not tolerate any US or Western pressure to change its internal system. They may also be a reflection of Yugoslav concern that Western aid, disassociated from political support of the government, is encouraging popular resistance to the regime's internal policies. 25X1 |
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| The Italian official said there were as yet no sig that the working class in general was prepared to undergo the serious sacrifices such strikes would entail. He further pointed out that the Communists had not succeeded anywhere in putting on mass "manifestations" to step up t "peace" campaign. He declared that the most dangerous and damaging aspe of current Communist activities was the widespread house-to-house propaga to the effect that the Italian Government's support of American policies, an particularly participation in the Atlantic Pact, meant war. Comment: This is the first definite information on Communist strike plans since midsummer when the Communists were reported planning European-wide crippling strikes this fall against US aid. There are no indications that such strikes are imminent in either France or Italy. | 1A | A "high official" of the Italian Ministry of Intertold US representatives in Rome on 17 October that leaders of the French and Italian Communi Parties had recently dropped plans for a series wide-scale strikes in both countries. The strikes ostensibly were to be strictly economic in character. |
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Correction to

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN (issue of 20 October 1951)

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ILLEGIB

The first sentence of article 9, page 8 should read:

A "high official" of the Italian Ministry of Interior told US representatives in Rome on 17 October that leaders of the French and Italian Communist Parties had recently <u>drafted</u> plans for a series of wide-scale strikes in both countries.

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